.@eu_commission .@eucouncil .@euparlament .@secblinken .@potus .@vp .@gchq .@nsagov .@odnigov .@ukraine .@kremlinrussia_e @atom @iaf_site .@israel @nato @otan @us_stratcom .@us_stratcom @pacificsubs @bbcr4 @france24 @rosatom .@energy @npr @atlanticcouncil @osce @bundeswehrinfo @osze tactically if and (!)ifonly kremlin wrestles with #thebutton ukraine may choose tactics that avert cumulations/smallthermonucleardevices targets requiremany ofsuch/ but this limits and (!)predicts! tactics which is dangerous and mayreduce effectivity
(!)if kremlin does (!)NOT wrestle with thebutton thereisnosuch adaption of tactics necessary.
greetings #to #wingtwo : explain compexity before your spirituals sidepicking assume things //////
#atom #critical #keypoint: when #putin says this their own real war: (!)and (!!!)if you used neutronbombs in realtime own conflicts: therussians are struggling with #thebutton (!)very
#civillians #have #no #relation #between #equipment #and #gore #it #causes : #i #n #d #e #pe #n #de #n #t #on #ukraine and #russia:
(allofthis)disclosure: ispeak formyself. ihave no stake/interest inthis criminal war of necessity. ispeculate on items/elements about the issue. wars are full of neutral states, notmywar. independent says about y o u r w a r:
when a few dozen artillery systems killed 150,000 russians, wait what more artillery, #apc s and 300 #mbt s do evenif used carefully and how quickly the dynamics speedup.
#keypoint you understimate the gore ahead. is the time for getout of ukraine and no appeasement possible b e f o r e the invasion : with hardlight on what was conquerred why after first raid failed(puppetregime replace trick failed): leads to what does russia secure for its post later status for frozenconflict aiming for conclusion summer2022: this. defines the a f t e rm a t h setup which must and can be a supercharging factor for a sustainable stable solution.
t a n k s !?. ukraine gets t h e n ? a n y w a y . with peace or frozen conflict status.
all drag quick into nato vs russia because sense russias weakness: and right this is critical
#keypoint (besides drag nato/russia) russia has no other strategy fordiplomacy but outof strength (!)else this endangers the internal powerstructure. the legitimation for brutal losses. (!)whichwilll a c c e l e r a t e now.
#keypoint rightnow b e f o r e the next stage gore is the time for a diplo fix.
all are like drunk about tank details in west. itis madness. /////
because russia needspeace they #keypoint planned this war to end 2022summer on which new borders: .@secblinken .@kremlinrussia_e .@ukraine notmywar and independent:
longerbarrel ifterrain allows to supercharge precisionnightvision thats the spanish leopard2? iwonder germanswouldgladly give em theirs haha a l o tmorethanukraine /////
tactical defensive equipment of .@ukraine @ukraine #ukraine: (own explosive reactive armor) era s willburnthrough #t55 hulls if: verify
hat is the thermobaric tandem shapecharge antitank munition version ofthat flamethrower thermobaric rocketlauncher:the chobham armor uses rubber likely because of capacitors electric discharge armor but howdoes thermobaric munition burnthrough
isay: they drop neutronbombs on own terrain in nighttime wars as last resort andor once cumulated enough upheaveled. that analot of electronbased weapons
#all are “hooray new tanks will bring us food and beatour enemies away” : i am telling you that abit personnel quality is all that averts usage of nuclear weapons /////
#atom: irrelevance of egos utterly: west doesnot take nuclear escalation serious and assumes itwas always a taboo. was it? bynow rattling that saber is proof of russias weakness nothing to take serious. too oftenand was always a taboo. w a s it always ataboo
isuspect superior internal quality of strategic forcesthat averted this escalation on major losses recent fall : this is speculation //////
#the #german #no #to #tank #deliveries #mbt #s
my axiom or assumption was that the decision to supplytanks in concert with all allies haslong been made tosupply leopard2
ifthis is averted inside socialdemocrats itis the: give away the right to sayno a g a i n s t the o w n a s s e s sm e n t s of deescalation / mild would be allow others to supply whichis thelikely step besides always in concert with allother states
wars arefull of neutral states. ifyoucannot sort this: independent says this about y o u r war
#strategically after failed to secure @ukraine from conquest by west by delegitimisin #ukraine s existence and fallback into oldways @kremlinrussia_e s mistake is believing own propaganda of superior forces underestimating western intel including preparations of defense and #keypoint how (!)critical bloodwar continent europe takes the irreversability of borders. next mistakes ahead maybe how west mayor maynot tolerate usage of nuclear weapons use on its nato border. #keypoint rationally acting putin needs peace and acts to conquer himselfwhats possible and necessary to survive as northkorea and stabilise power with this: andright this : has limits of appeasement in west and ukraine . thenext spring offensives are rather not preventable diplomatically but maybe should: ifthese axioms are correct
mybest longrange scan: #keypoint all underestimate the ignorance of brute s and ruthless monsters, assume rational and commonduress(humancondition) and are always surprised how someone dared sth all assumed would not. the only thing averting then monstrosities agonies of mankind is that what limits the possibilities and powers of monsters intheir own real abilities commit monstrosities: all moral will not rescueyou fromconcentrationcamps. theydaredtomake.afterexterminating countless. whilemixingmore poison adjacent
canigetinfos onthe tank axioms and strategy aspects @ukraine #and @kremlinrussia_e #strategically #tactically #i #n #d #e #p #e #nd #en #t .@gchq @atom @iaf_site .@israel @nato @otan @us_stratcom .@us_stratcom @pacificsubs @bbcr4 @france24 @rosatom .@energy @npr @atlanticcouncil @osce @bundeswehrinfo @osze
russia sacrificed 150K soldiers for a campaign in tactically locked up against modern western artillery in tight synchronisation with sensors. the russian arms quality was inferior and itsmain tank weapons got inert in rpg and pzh2000 supplies. achieving tactical goals was interdicted, now s o f t units (infantry) run into this modern artillery lockup and restrained mbt usage. this explains why afew dozen western artillerysystes doomed 150,000 russian soldiers.
the #mbt axioms and implications listed below.
strategically russia fights a western anti appeasement policy which is used/mobilise westernblock to reblock against china. while ukraine campaigns need this russian war concluded this year so does russia. while the effectivity of the springoffensives tanksystems decide how this will workout / the russia mustgetout of ukraine is likely relativated internally more or less depending on mbt campaigns. the russian maingoal not tobecome northkorea and understanding the appeasement impossibility musthandle internally as strongman leadership imperialism justifications and this makes it questionable if and how long putin can cling to power against what : eventhis all used by security system as priority is a side effect of china as maingoal which outscales west -inthat sense someone tries to conquer ukraine for west against russia and underestimates how forevertry tryforever russias engagement in ukraine is and will remain: this isnot afghanistan in and out so what: this leads tothe aftermath implications if ukraine wants tobe an agricultural colony with wardebts dependent on west constantly interferred by russia onanypossibility forever or if theycanbe a bridge to stabilise a failing russia. the eu membership of a halfrussiancountry with forever tries by russia is a risk the aftermath canbe a supercharging aspect once these elements are understood around appeasement not possible.
#notricks #with #bae #and #goodenough
when uk delivers challenger2:
#keypoint there is no trickery about ir iir recommended: alotof the comparativeadvantages of western mbt s over soviet were (!)ir iir ranges (nightbattle effective range) and (!)battlecomputer movable targets:
allofthese relativated depends how russiantanks are equipped how integrated communication coordinated with whcihother sensors theyare
#keypoint sensors to overwhealming precision firepower/ precise concentration of firepower while hiding from enemy sensors as battle centerpoint: all relativated with adversaries advancements
all relative and not as gamechanging asyouthink mbts are:
#axiom : analysis based on western assumption that thousands of retrofitted stock tanks flood frontlines : is the retrofit equipment really inferior / #keypoint relativates the advantages /no tricks with bae and goodenough
#abrams #leopard2 #challenger #leclerc
arabs busted nyebrems-1 mbt s whichare spawn of leopard2 ancestor: how didthe breachpoints translate into leopard2 armor then? ignored?abit canadian mine protection and engine fencing?
my bbbbest advice on #ukraine #russia situation: #keypoint make facts for an agreeable aftermath:
these tankratio is acceptable up to parity of systems,minimum thesecounts. tradegate to west over ukraine:them as main harmed decide howmuch tradegate: russia outof ukraine focus on not becoming northkorea instead imperial conquest gains
#on #tactical #systems
principally the analysis leads to apache+patriots wheretheycouldmmaybenot handle maintain orkeepthemsurvivable tobe effective letalone gammechaning. precision enhancements sensors andmunitions for overwhealm concentrate firepower on moving targets in dynamicscnearios. theyaim for mig29 for droneintercept wqithout abletokeepthem safe onrunwaydependent and on tank battles ?butsuperior armor: onlythat e a c h tank is vulnerable af /////
varies from helpful to nuisance? to alot more seriousproblems? a l o t more serious? ////
ukrainewillneed tanks in aftermath: if @kremlinrussia_e has a say inthe aftermath: does #west decide this? : parity is reasonable feasible
#on #ukraine #tactical #systems
#keypoint what is the operational (effective sortierates) (!)survivability of heavy cas systems:when the modern axiom is sensors first:whocares whichsystem does the hit
from lookdownshootdown aesa modes of airborne sensors on rotarywing systems to modern multiband infrared systems electrooptics to airborne lidar a r r a y s with their traits and effective proximites
#keypoint battlefield intensity showed the requirement for this but the 1970 1980s axioms of flylow enough and fast enough do clearly lead to an inacceptablelossrate letalone questions of effectivity despite all adaptions of tactics //////
#ukraine has troubles with #lookdownshootdown #a100 #a50 ? from #belarus ?oreven flankerfire?nobigdeal at 100miles chopperhit?
(!)survivability heavy cas tweaks would be:
wie erklaereicheuch das besser: alles ist so dass euere lokal lords mit axt und scheiterhaufen h e r r s c h e n @deutschland @bild @davos .@msc @msc .@profklausschwab @profklausschwab @phoenix_de @dw @dwnews
#keypoint expansion of security providers vs security takers must be a core focus because the us socioeconomics are frail. the (!)lackoftrust within the eu withoneof the core elements of this whenever nationalisms mess which mechanisms are irrelevant or used in national conflicts rather:
the joint procurement and joint development of systems for feasibility/supportability and handsdown quality assurance (incontrary to exaggerated national ambitions) are one aspect: with coreproblem tech transfer and are really warmechanisms possible oreven efforted inthe realtime that not enough trust is possible
#keypoint proven trustbuildingmeasures with mechanisms solvingdiscord and atleast deeper integration onlevels of trust that a r e possible francophile anglophile germanophile 3armies of europe to boost security providers whilemaininting feasibility ofthis all
the drift is openconflict with russia east but ukraine is held w a y toofragile on new russian all in efforts :despite all weakness of russia, ukraine is weaktoo v e r y: ispeculate they held the front without reserves and unable to control how quickly the tide turns without effective systems
russia needs a hedged diplomatic aftermath but the imperialist gains are theonly last ditch effort the own power seemstobe justified. moreimportant is notbecome a northkorea whichdeclinates onwhocan even support em letalone want to
#on #davos #2023
then?thereare?those that do not w a n t to know: w h y ? a r e ? y o u ? h e r e ? .@profklausschwab .@sun @sun @profklausschwab @wef .@wef @davos .@davos #on #davos #davos2023 @imf @msc .@msc
#keypoint institutions translate policy: these are the transfer mechanism: the lackof acceptance ofthese leads straight into: accountability including for mistakes and quibono: simpler: doyou keep dumpsters and dumpsterfires the fix for themistakes but repeat how to exploit it for very narrow personal interest along your pyramid scheme : this:
versus: goodgovernance – including how mistakes are handled
#keypoint ecology as moral heroism from withinthe system (of numbers and exploitation of dumpsters) is a greenwash: itmust make very!good!businesssense!to act efficiently and ecologically and this within moral rules
#keypoint themoreyou d e p e n d onthe acceptance of thepopulation themore you handle various subcultures that require accountability fromthe system as moral leadership: youstart in a pit. from you from predecessors from future beneficors : you trickthem more and continued into a dumpster
#keypoint freedom based societies aremagic. because they arenot free ? because of socio economics? w h y ? are? free?societies? magic!? : declinate socioeconomics with goodgovernance with freedoms
ifyouneed a path along that trail is a must from betrayed forevervictimised wounded: itis more than performance itis inwhich conditions you empower who to do what and the for what: with justice as basis: themore youdepend on acceptance of thepopulation / freesocieties models do / citizenmodels
reframed: #ukraine had no reserves but didnt win in the holdback recent weeks : fragile weak front: yes? thatswhy: screamfor mbt s!!!
#keypoint west underestimates how w e a k #ukraine is whenthey tried to hold that (!)without reserves
ifthe retreat was for saving reserves andor second front how weak is ukraine depends what they held off
by style not sacrificing before tanks arrive is possible too
if overthought second front can be an andor ie a n d as pincer strategy to encircle
#keypoint west underestimates how w e a k #ukraine is whenthey tried to hold that (!)without reserves and without heavy arms
youare the generals with info
gore hells blllah
ispeakformyself ispeculateonsomeelements ihaveno stake/interest inthat criminal war //////
@wef .@wef @davos .@davos #davos #davos2023 @imf @msc .@msc wellcongrats youhavemade yourself a system inwhich you porned and leeched the civilpopulation as porned toddlers. foryour sole gain. securitylord wise. #keypoint areyou criminal? or didyou. quickly. self forfeit eachother quickly.thentoo.then
i d e m an d access tomyfortune whatever your criminal clowns try here
iam a longterm goodactor: are y o u ? got fat recent year? from: #davos #davos2023 @davos .@wef @wef arentyouthe weasels that wackmyfriends toquell inventions then?
.@atom @iaf_site .@israel @nato @otan @us_stratcom .@us_stratcom @pacificsubs @bbcr4 @france24 @rosatom .@energy @npr @atlanticcouncil @osce @bundeswehrinfo @osze reframed if iwere general
#keypoint which systems make apache superhind extremely survivable to roam vast terrain safely from lookdownshootdown and sam threats to (!)concentrate overwhealming firepower (!)precisely and timecritically ********
while onthe otherside: the tactical clutter aside like protectingmbt s from topfire : the strategy is farmoreimportant than imperial gain to stabilise domestic power after isolationbasedmistake to invade/invasion failed: how avert becoming northkorea anddangerous west missioncreep drag drift intowest conflict heatedup proxywar
#check #this #axiom #critically #youre #the #pro #generals #and #geniusses
while cliche s switch between mobility,firepower,protection, i add stayingpower and sensorsbased highintensity initiative
this pentagon of targetconflict means
#keypoint that highprecisionsensors need toput timecritically inhighlydynamic highintensity situations right then (!)superior firepower precisely ontarget while the mobility and protection must be important/incontrary to negligable. *********
while the disruption of coordination of artillery and hacking windows2000 for pzh2000 is often enoughto breach lines shows only how f r a g i l e weak underarmed underequipped ukraine is.
russia needs peace but bound its internal leadership legitimation of all losses to what russians accept as success which is imperial gains. and if this defines their strategy itis a mistake. critical is not to become northkorea and hedge supercharge diplomatic solution of the (!)aftermath as west understimates how forever effort ukraine willbe (this is a speculation/declination/deduction/combination element)
idontget howthey send 14mbt s butnot 7apache.ie critically survivable highintensity cas. russiaglad theygavein but its regroup for tanks
theproblem with #ironcourtain #s is that there cannot and mustnot be appeasement but that people die on these courtains. everyday. and the situations often heatup itis a downwards spiral stopped recovered spirallingdown recovering. with (!)unstable participants this time. #peace #through #strength
#on #ukraine campaigners aim for a conclusionofthe war this year 2023 atsomepoint: this maybe a misunderstanding whilerussia will handle it as aforver try
the aftermath willdefine critical things which is a chance but itis a mistake to assume itis solved once this year aiming for a conclusion of war
tactically the western tanks maybe gamechanging with effectivemunitions but willbe hyped themore these systems are anticipated and prepared:
#keypoint the key is how survivable can bulk cas be effective
#keypoint the fragility of mbt s a n y mbt over various sensors and which systems inrange handle them means flawed mbt hopes a n d flawed 2023conclusionwarcampaign hopes *********
the results are defining illbeback orand other priorities losing bigtime secondfront : depends. whatdothe thousands of generals think?
idontthink russians would lock their equipment into salt mines ukraine seals in locked. tacticalmotivation low?but conquer imperialism gains for russia toshow for or and second front. or itis overinterpretation. deeperinfo can declinate either case
#keypoint @ukraine campaign: someone tries to conquest an agricultural colony for western food supplies and this for a decade: this broke out of contol underestimating how f a r @kremlinrussia_e will go to keepit: tothe point to intent to dismantle it to chain it or bits of it.
#keypoint thisis a very dangerous situation and now is in an open drift of west and east while russia is as weak as can be acts still rationally y e t : from risk aspect takes irrational leadership, instability breakup with factions, or @china reconsidering something beit to avert this or humiliations:mistakes over taiwan. while fearing war.
#keypoint any successful ukraine campaign bonds an instability halfrussian country with a forevertrying russia ifthe aftermath is botched which canbe a chance
what a luck that all are tank experts bynow
that can then
aeh help then abit to aeh defeat evil then
#keypoint concert of soft rolling testicles that quicklyroll in effectively in tight cover of supercharged (!!)survivable hind/(!!)apache/ frogfoot/ warthog for vast terrain : while otherside needs rather testicle (!!)armor enhancement to matter and disrupt coordination (!!!)whilesupplies atall
in #ukraine war early stages 2022 sending not artillery but adozen mig29 : how idiotic wouldthathave been russia on offensive : ruling airspace without a runway safe six light hardpoints for small interceptor tasks : obsolete supercharged clunker
my tactical requirements assessment at this early2023 stage is ukraine to w i n needs heavy cas survivable+effective where the adversarialforce struggles theycan supercharge and only need a specific effectivity threshhold to change game letalone to put smallnumbers to matter. itis a bold assessment depending on the specific system andits defenses
the adversarial force needs rather effectivity of its mbt s agains topdown strikes and coordination of the other side
but belong nowhere near that country. not at all. the supplylines and such are nobrainers but foremost: the strategy to conquest empire against allwest hesitant y e t is a dangerous and bad move out of weakness:
west underestimates how all in russia is about ukraine and forever. itis instability integrated
whichleads to the aftermath as superchargeable spot to fix things which mustnot be appeasement to isolationmistake empire conquest errorstrategy as only wayto fix breakaway of proximity into control of adversary
I am Christian KISS
BabyAWACS – Raw Independent Sophistication
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